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Wilson v. Seiter: Prison Conditions and
the Eighth Amendment Standard
INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that this country's prisons are facing a crisis. In
recent years the number of inmates under the jurisdiction of federal
and state correctional authorities has reached successive highs,
capping over a decade of dramatic growth.' Despite states'
increased spending on prison construction and other efforts,2 most
state prison systems are operating over capacity Seeking relief
from often severe prison 'conditions, prisoners have inundated the
1. See BUREAU OF JusncE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990,
BUUETIN I (May 1991) (table 1) (reporting that the 1990 year-end United States total was 771,243
prisoners, up 133.8% from 1980, in which 329,821 prisoners were reported). California alone had
97,309 inmates in 1990, up 94.0% from 1985. Id at 4 (table 4).
2. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JuSTICE EXPENDITURE AmD
EMPLOYMENT, 1988, BULLETIN 5 (July 1990) (table 5) (reporting that the percentage of total capital
outlays by state governments for prison construction rose from 7.7% in 1977 to 12.9% in 1988); Lisa
Belidn, Rise of Private Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1989, at A14
(describing the advantages and disadvantages of prison privatization); Ted Gest et al., Why More
Criminals Are Doing Time Beyond Bars, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 26, 1990, at 23
(explaining alternatives to prison incarceration such as intensive probation, day-reporting centers, and
fines).
3. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990,
BULLETIN 6 (May 1991) (table 8) (reporting 42 jurisdictions and the federal prison system operating
at 100% or more of their lowest capacity, and 34 of these with populations equal to or exceeding
their highest reported capacities); id. (reporting California as being at 185% of ful capacity);
Anthony DePalma, Jails Face New Crisis As Inmates Grow 04 N.Y. TrAEs, May 28, 1990, § 1,
at 23 (discussing the effects of the exploding population of aging inmates on prisons including need
for expensive medical care); Barbara Flicker, To Jail or Not to Jail? (The Drug War), A.B.A. J., Feb.
1990, at 64, 64-66 (providing statistics from a survey of 68 jails around the country from January
1988 to January 1989, and concluding that the average jail was 37.7% over capacity); Debra C. Moss,
Drug Cases Clog the Courts; Civil Suits Suffer; Prisons Overcrowded in 43 States, A.B.A. J., April
1990, at 34, 34 (discussing the strain on America's justice system due to drug prosecutions, and
citing statistics stating that prisons are overcrowded in 43 states). See generally Jeff Bleich,
Comment, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77 CAL. L REV. 1125 (1989) (discussing the ambiguity
and political motivations behind prison crowding statistics).
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judicial system with complaints.4 As of January 1, 1990, forty-one
states and the District of Columbia had some or all of their prisons
operating under court order due to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement.5 Some courts have even released inmates due to
prison officials' failure to ameliorate constitutional violations.6
Whether a court finds that prison conditions violate the
Constitution often depends on the legal standard it employs.7 In
Wilson v. Seiter, the latest in an evolution of prison cases, the
Supreme Court of the United States set forth the current standard
for determining the constitutionality of prison conditions.9 It
decided that prison conditions are unconstitutional only if prison
officials display "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's human
need. l" Thus, the Wilson standard governs prisoners' ability to
4. See BuREAu OF JusncE STATISTICs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1990, at 528 (1991) (table 5.55) (reporting a rise in civil rights petitions by
state prisoners from 7,752 in 1977 to 25,039 in 1989); see also Stephanie Chavez, Rights Group Cites
Prison Cruelty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at A3 (describing a human rights group's citation of
questionable disciplinary practices in "maximum-maximum" prison facilities and recommendation
of reforms); Linda Greenhouse, Washington Talk; "Pauper" Cases Reshape High Court's Caseload,
N.Y. TmMS, Jan. 28, 1991, at A16 (explaining how the dramatic increase in prisoner petitions is
reshaping the United States Supreme Court's caseload).
5. SHEUDON KRim & LYNN S. BRANHAM, CASES AND MATERiA ON THE LAW OF
SENTENrcNG, CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIoHS 502 (4th ed. 1991) (citing THE NATIONAL
PRI sON PRomnEr, STATUS REPORT. T COURTS AND THE PRISONS (1990)); see, e.g., Williams v.
Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206,1218 (5th Cir. 1977); Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 700 F. Supp. 1180, 1199 (D.
1RI. 1988) (ordering authorities to develop a plan to eliminate prison crowding).
6. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2d 292,298 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirming order directing the
release of pretrial detainees incarcerated solely because they could not pay low bonds), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1108 (1984); see also Lee Hockstader, D.C. Ordered to Cut Prison Population; Judge Says
300 at Central Must Go, WASH. PoST, Aug. 2, 1988, § 1, at Al (describing a federal court order
reducing the number of acceptable inmates at a District of Columbia prison due to unconstitutional
conditions); Robert Suro, As Inmates Are Freed, Houston Feels Insecure, N.Y. TM.s, Oct. 1, 1990,
at A16 (reporting increasing sales in burglar alarms and guns and loss of faith in the criminal justice
system after inmates were released early under a federal court order).
7. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (1991) (requiring prison officials'
deliberate indifference to prison conditions for an Eighth Amendment violation); Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (requiring officials' malicious and sadistic use of force in maintaining
prison security for an Eighth Amendment violation); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)
(requiring officials' deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs for an Eighth
Amendment violation).
8. 111 S. CL 2321 (1991).
9. See Wilson, 111 S. CL at 2327 (requiring prison officials' deliberate indifference to prison
conditions for an Eighth Amendment violation).
10. Id
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obtain judicial relief from harsh prison conditions. This Note
evaluates the historical and practical significance of the Supreme
Court's choice of the deliberate indifference standard.
Part I of this Note briefly reviews the history of prison reform
and the advances prisons have made since the conception of such
reform."' It also discusses courts' gradual involvement in prison
reform in the 1960s to protect prisoners' constitutional rights. 2
Part II describes the United States Supreme Court's traditional
standard for determining whether punishments are cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment, 3 and Part III traces the
transformation of that standard through the Court's prison
conditions cases. 14 The Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v.
Seiter is discussed in Part IV. 5 Finally, Part V analyzes the
Wilson opinion and considers its ramifications.16
I. A BREF HISTORY OF PRISON REFORM
A. Institutional Reform of Prisons
Incarceration in prisons has not always been imposed as a
means of punishment. Until the 1700s, punishment for criminals
commonly consisted of public branding, mutilation, whipping, and
hanging. 17 Imprisonment in workhouses functioned primarily to
detain vagrants, debtors, minor offenders, and criminals awaiting
trial or punishment. 8 Conditions were squalid and overcrowded,
11. See infra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 35-70 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 86-161 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 162-204 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 205-62 and accompanying text.
17. RONALD L GOLDFARB & LINDA P, SINGER, AFM CONVICTION 21 (1973); ESTELLE B.
FREEDMAN, TEI SISTERS' KEEPERS: WOMEN's PRISON REFORM IN AMERICA, 1830-1930, at 8
(1981).
18. See CALVYET R. DODUE A NATIoN WITHoUT PRISONS 3-4 (1975); GOLDFARB & SINGER,
supra note 17, at 20; BLAKE MCKIRVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A HISTORY OF GOOD INENT&ONS 2
(1977) (describing early detention facilities).
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and children, criminals, lepers, and the insane were all kept
together.19
In the late 1700s, dissatisfaction with capital and corporal
punishment was widespread, and a desire for more humanitarian
treatment of criminals increased.2" Institutions called penitentiaries
were created in New York and Pennsylvania to reform criminals
(make them feel penitent) by eliminating harmful influences,
emphasizing hard work, and providing an opportunity for
introspection and religious study.21 Despite these goals, prisons
achieved disappointing results.' They became overcrowded and
oppressive, and the prison experience impaired prisoners' ability to
function in the free world.' Prisons rapidly deteriorated into
purely custodial institutions.'
A new wave of optimism about rehabilitation began after the
Civil War. 5 Prisoners were given vocational training and
education, they were segregated based on progress and deportment,
and they received indeterminate sentences and early release on
parole if they improved.26 But the grading system developed into
a reward for conformity, the prison routine became a repressive
regimen, and overcrowding prevented individualized treatment. 27
19. VERNON Fox, CORREcTIONAL INsTIrtrnoNs 10 (1983); GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note
17, at 20; see id. ("The detention facilities were terrible places - overcrowded, dark, ditty, models
of idleness and vice, without ventilation and with the scantiest of facilities.").
20. See DODGE, supra note 18, at 4; FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 8; GOLDFARB & SINGER,
supra note 17, at 27; McKELvEy, supra note 18, at 7-8 (discussing the development of prisons in
Pennsylvania and New York).
21. DODGF, supra note 18, at 4-5; TORSTEN ERIKSSON, THE REFORMERS: AN HISTORIcAL
SURVEY OF PIONEER EXPERIMENTS IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIMINALS 45-46 (Catherine Djurklou
trans. 1976); FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 8-9; GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 17, at 23-24.
22. DoDGE, supra note 18, at 5; GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 17, at 45.
23. DODG., supra note 18, at 5; see FOx, supra note 19, at 14 (stating that overcrowding had
become a problem by the middle of the nineteenth century); GOLDFARB & SINGER, supra note 17,
at 44-45 (maintaining that the reformist plan has failed and that the idea that an incarcerated man will
emerge normal and adjusted is preposterous).
24. FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 10.
25. DAvID FOGEL, "...WE ARE THE LiIaG PROOF...": TEE JusiicE MODEL FOR
CORRECTnONS 30 (1979).
26. Id at 34-35.
27. Id at 35.
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While the rehabilitative ideal persisted as the chief goal of
punishment during much of the present century,' it began to
decline in the 1970s.29 Dissatisfaction with rehabilitation focused
on concerns about judges' broad sentencing discretion and widely
disparate sentences, a desire to counter the capricious uses of state
power, and the lack of success with rehabilitative efforts." A
retributive theory of punishment gradually gained acceptance under
which criminals were punished because it was their "just deserts"
for having engaged in wrongful conduct.3 Funds to rehabilitate
prisoners have subsequently shrunk, legislators have lengthened
sentences, and prison populations have doubled.32 Prisoners are
packed into crumbling, understaffed, vermin-infested institutions
rife with rape and gang violence.33 Out of necessity, prisoners
have turned to the courts for relief.'
28. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHBILITAlVE IDEAL 5 (1981); WAYNE R.
LAFAvE AND AUSTIN W. SCOTt, CRIMINAL LAw 28-29 (2d ed. 1986).
29. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 28, at 28 (summarizing the reasons for the decline of
the rehabilitative ideal). See generally ALLEN, supra note 28 (tracing the rise and fall of the
rehabilitative ideal); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL L REV. 1011, 1018-32
(1991) (reviewing the judicial, legislative, and scholarly critiques of the rehabilitative model).
30. LAFAVE & ScOat, supra note 28, at 29.
31. See id. at 25-26, 29 (describing the retributive theory and recognizing its increasing
acceptance as a justification for punishment).
32. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1990,
BULLETIN 1 (May 1991) (table 1) (reporting that the 1990 year-end United States total was 771,243
prisoners, up 133.8% from 1980, in which 329,821 prisoners were reported); Vitiello, supra note 29,
at 1029-31 (describing sentencing reforms); For the Record, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1990, at A26
(stating that overcrowded prisons preclude prisoners from developing skills); Imprisonment Inequities,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1990, at 18 (reporting that prisoners have little hope of learning skills after
incarceration).
33. See, e.g., Sandra J. Boodman, Prison Medical Crisis; Overcrowding Created by the War
on Drugs Poses a Public Health Emergency, WASH. POST, July 7, 1992, at 25 (reporting that the war
on drugs has led to an unprecedented growth in prison populations, straining medical services and
exposing inmates to life-threatening diseases); Sharon LaFraniere, In Maine, Prison Crowding Leaves
Grisly Legacy, WASH. POST., Feb. 21, 1992, § 1, at Al (describing prison violence and overcrowding
in Maine); Stuart J. Taylor, Commentary: Taking Issue, RECORDER, June 21, 1991, at 4 (describing
conditions in the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh).
34. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the dramatic rise in prisoner petitions
to courts).
279
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 24
B. The Role of the Courts in Prison Reform
Traditionally, courts refused to hear prisoners' suits regarding
prison administration or conditions on the grounds that review of
the internal management of prison systems was not within their
jurisdiction.35 Several rationales supported this so-called "hands-
off" doctrine.36 Early courts justified the doctrine by classifying
prisoners as slaves of the state who had forfeited their rights.37
Later courts grounded their unwillingness to involve themselves in
prison administration primarily upon principles of separation of
powers,38  federalism,39  and lack of expertise regarding
35. See, e.g., Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 858, 859 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 395 U.S. 929 (1969);
Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504,505-06 (10th Cir. 1969); Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 688 (8th
Cir. 1967) (refusing to hear prisoners' suits on jurisdictional grounds). See generally Comment,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts,
72 YALE LJ. 506,508 n.12 (1963) (collecting earlier cases, generally criticizing the courts' refusal
to hear prisoners' cases, and suggesting guidelines for judicial review of the prison system). Courts
have permitted suits against individual jailers. See, e.g., State of Indiana ex rel Tyler v. Gobin, 94
F. 48, 49-50 (C.C.D. Ind. 1899); Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88, 89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
875 (1960); Magenheimer v. State ex rel Dalton, 90 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ind. CL App. 1950) (in bane);
Smith v. Miller, 40 N.W.2d 597,598 (Iowa Sup. CL 1950); O'Dell v. Goodsell, 30 N.W.2d 906,909
(Neb. Sup. CL 1948).
36. See generally Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis
of the Decline of the "Hands-Off' Doctrine, 1977 DaT. C.L. REv. 795 (discussing courts'
justifications for the hands-off doctrine and documenting its decline). Evidently, this phrase frst
appeared in a document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See FITcH, CIVIL RIoHTS OF
FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31 (1961).
37. Haas, supra note 36, at 797 (citing Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790,794-
96 (1872)).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
817 (1965); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971
(1956); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); Powell v.
Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949); Heft v. Parker, 258 F. Supp. 507, 508 (M.D. Pa. 1966);
Lewis v. Gladden, 230 F. Supp. 786,788 (D. Or. 1964); Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906,
908 (W.D. Va. 1953), questioned in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963) (refusing to
hear prisoners' cases on the ground that the federal prison system is operated by the attorney general,
part of the executive branch of the government, not by the judiciary).
39. See, e.g., Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545,546 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 887 (1966); Oregon ex rel Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1957); Siegel v.
Ragen, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950) (refusing to hear prisoners'
cases on the ground that a federal court has no power to control the internal discipline of state
prisons).
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penology.' Courts also feared that judicial intervention would
seriously undermine prison discipline4' and that judicial review
would inundate the courts with prisoner petitions.42
The hands-off doctrine began to decline during the late 1960s,
however, when courts found prison practices so unreasonable and
exceptional that judicial involvement was necessary to protect
prisoners' constitutional rights.43 In addition, news coverage of the
violent prison riots in Attica, New York, and San Quentin,
California, increased public awareness of prisoners' conditions, and
eventually encouraged a change in judicial attitudes.' Prisons
were run down, and the resources needed to improve them were
scant.45 Further, the broad challenges to social and economic
40. See, e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951); Fussa v. Taylor, 168
F. Supp. 302, 303-04 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 706, 707 (M.D. Pa. 1949)
(stating that it is not within the province of the courts to superintend the treatment of prisoners); see
also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (noting that the expertise of prison officials should
be deferred to regarding prison security); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)
(commenting on courts' inexpertise in dealing with prison administration problems).
41. See, e.g., Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253,277 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, United States
v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783,784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Sigmon
v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 910 (W.D. Va. 1953), questioned in United States v. Muniz, 374
U.S. 150, 153 (1963); Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. IMI. 1949), aft'd, 180 F.2d 785
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950) (refusing to hear prisoners' cases on the grounds that
it would undermine prison discipline).
42. See, e.g., Barnettv. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995,1004 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Tamm, J., concurring);
Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 433 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967)
(refusing to hear prisoners' cases on the grounds that it would inundate the courts with prisoner
petitions).
43. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921,923-24 (2d Cir. 1970) (upholding cause of
action against warden for ordering prisoner recuperating from surgery to be moved contrary to
physician's orders), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, (1971); dates v. Ciccone, 422 F.2d 926, 927-28 (8th
Cir. 1970) (recognizing cause of action but finding that petitioner's allegations of cruel and unusual
punishment did not rise to the level of "unusual and exceptional circumstances"); Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571, 577-79 (8th Cir. 1968) (upholding cause of action and prohibiting use of the whipping
strap); Queen v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 307 F. Supp. 841, 844-45, 848 (D. S.C. 1970)
(recognizing a cause of action against prison officials but finding plaintiff's claims of arbitrary and
discriminatory treatment did not warrant relief).
44. See Gary Wood, Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on Cruel and Unusual
Punishments: Judicially Enforced Reform of Nonfederal Penal Institutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1111,
1112-13 (1972) (stating that media coverage of outspoken inmates and prison violence initiated a
change in judicial attitudes regarding prison confinement).
45. Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399,402 (5th Cir. 1978) (describing oppressive conditions in
the Mississippi State Penitentiary), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail
v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676, 679-84 (D. Mass. 1973) (describing the unsanitary and inadequate
conditions in the Suffolk County Jail), af'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, Hall v.
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policies coupled with protest activism that occurred during the
1960s helped spur reform.46 Other factors that increased judicial
involvement included the increasing prison population of middle-
class draft evaders who had the resources to challenge prison
policies, civil rights lawyers who broadened their work to include
prisoners' cases, and an abiding interest in the academic and
professional communities in rehabilitating prisoners and treating
them with dignity.47
Courts began striking down as unconstitutional specific prison
practices such as the use of corporal punishment,48 failure to
provide a work assignment compatible with an inmate's health,49
and imposition of austere sleeping and living conditions. ° In 1970
judicial review expanded beyond discrete prison practices in the
watershed case of Holt v. Sarver,5 where a federal district court
found Arkansas' entire prison system unconstitutional.52
The court in Holt stated that "[flor the ordinary convict a
sentence to the Arkansas Penitentiary amounts to a banishment
from civilized society to a dark and evil world completely alien to
the free world.", 53 Prisoners in Arkansas were required to work in
agricultural fields ten hours a day, six days a week, tending crops
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 419 U.S. 977 (1974).
46. RONALD BERKMAN, OPENING THE GATES: THE RIsg op TE PRIsoNERs" MOVEMENT 41
(1979).
47. Id. at 41-42.
48. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 581 (8th Cit. 1968) (prohibiting infliction of
corporal punishment, including use of the whipping strap, as a disciplinary measure).
49. See Black v. Ciccone, 324 F. Supp. 129, 131-33 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (holding that job
assignment in barber shop was incompatible with inmate's hip disease and violated the Eighth
Amendment).
50. See Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 791-92 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). The inmate was
forced to sleep in the nude on a bare concrete floor without adequate fight or ventilation and was
required to live and eat under animal-like conditions. Id,
51. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd and cause remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971), on remand, Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. Ark. 1973), affd in part and rev'd in part,
Finney v. Arkcansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), on remand, Finney v. Hutto,
410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark 1976), afid, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 (1978).
52. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 384-85. Other cases involved in the Arkansas prison litigation
include: Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804
(E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cit. 1968); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.
Ark. 1965).
53. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 381.
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by hand and with mule-drawn tools, and without adequate clothing
or shoes.54 Inmates were whipped with wooden-handled leather
straps and tortured with electrical shocks." They were guarded by
armed inmates called "trusties," who were authorized to use
deadly force against escapees.5" Homosexual rape was so
prevalent that, instead of sleeping, inmates would cling to the bars
nearest the guards' station.57 An average of four, but as many as
eleven, prisoners were squeezed into eight-by-ten-foot cells without
windows or furniture, except a toilet that could be flushed only
from outside the cell.
58
The Arkansas cases provided a starting point for lower courts
and commentators to delineate the scope and purpose of the Eighth
Amefidment in the context of prison conditions.59 A decade of
cases followed, declaring prison and jail conditions unconstitutional
and frequently ordering massive structural reform.'
The Supreme Court of the United States's first prison
conditions cases continued in this reformist vein.6' In 1976 the
Supreme Court validated the availability of a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 when prison personnel were deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs.62 Two years later
54. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 n.3 (1978) (citing Talley. 247 F. Supp. at 688, and
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 370).
55. Id. at 682 nn.4-5 (citing Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 687, and Jackson, 268 F. Supp. at 812).
56. Id. at 682 n.6 (citing Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 374).
57. Id. at 681-82 n.3 (citing Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 377).
58. Id at 682 (citing Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 831-32 (E.D. Ark. 1969)).
59. See Rod Smolla, Prison Overcrowding and the Courts: A Roadmap for the 1980s, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 398-400; Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded
Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.1L-C.L L REV. 367, 372 (1977); Samuel H.
Pillsbury, Note, Creatures, Persons, and Prisoners: Evaluating Prison Conditions Under the Eighth
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099,1102-03; Ronald H. Rosenberg, Comment, Constitutional Law
- The Eighth Amendment and Prison Reform, 51 N.C. L. REV. 1539,1542-43 (1973) (discussing the
Holt decision).
60. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,353 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing
cases in 24 states that had declared individual prisons or entire prison systems unconstitutional under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
61. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
62. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). The Court decided in this case, however,
that the prisoner's complaint did not state a cause of action against the prison's medical director. Id
at 108.
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the Supreme Court upheld the injunctions imposed on the Arkansas
prisons in the Holt litigation.63
However, the Supreme Court subsequently stepped back from
its role as reformer in two separate cases by refusing to declare the
practice of confining two prisoners in a single cell
unconstitutional.' The acceptability of prison conditions, the
Supreme Court declared, is properly determined by state
legislatures and prison administrations; courts should reserve only
an oversight responsibility in scrutinizing claims of unconstitutional
conditions.65 More recently, in the case of Whitley v. Albers" the
Court held that shooting a prisoner in the course of a riot did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment since the shooting was not
a wanton infliction of pain.67 The Whitley Court concluded that
prison administrators are to be accorded ample deference in matters
of prison security and discipline.68
Thus, while modern courts have rejected the absolute deference
to prison officials characteristic of the hands-off era, they have also
opposed unbridled judicial involvement in prison reform. While
judicial prison reform gained momentum during the late 1960s and
'70s, in the 1980s the Supreme Court began to define the limits of
the courts' role in prison reform. 9 The Court indicated that it
favored deferring to the discretion of prison officials.70
63. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1978) (affirming the district court's placement of
a limit of 30 days of confinement in punitive isolation, and award of attorneys' fees to be paid out
of Department of Corrections funds based upon bad faith in failing to cure previously identified
violations).
64. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-49 (1981) (refusing to find double-celling
violative of the Eighth Amendment); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542-43 (1979) (refusing to find
double-ce~ling violative of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
65. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349, 352.
66. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
67. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319, 324.
68. lId at 321-22 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
69. See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text (discussing Rhodes); infra notes 126-37
and accompanying text (discussing Whitley).
70. See Whitey, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979));
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349, 352 (deferring to prison administrators).
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II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
Prisoners have relied primarily upon the Eighth Amendment in
their claims regarding prison conditions.71 The Eighth Amendment
prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment" and was
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
in 1962.72
In early cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme
Court looked to what was "cruel and unusual" during the time of
the Constitution's framers.7 3 It concluded that the primary purpose
of the amendment was to prohibit sentences mandating barbarous
physical punishments and tortures, such as public dissection and
burning alive.74 These punishments were forbidden because they
were unnecessarily cruel.' However, it was not death itself that
made these punishments cruel, but rather that they involved torture
or a lingering death.76
71. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321,2322-23 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 317 (1986); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 339 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
101 (1976) (alleging Eighth Amendment violations).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
73. See In re Kemnler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (relying upon Blackstone); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (relying upon Blackstone and Archbold). See generally Harmelin
v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2686-99 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J., in which Rehnquist, CJ.,
joined); Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted:'" The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL L. REV. 839 (1969) (tracing the history of the cruel and unusual punishment
provision of the Eighth Amendment). Courts have generally refused to acknowledge a meaningful
distinction between the words "cruel" and "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 379 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("The term 'unusual' cannot be read
as limiting the ban on 'cruel' punishments or as somehow expanding the meaning of the term
'cruel."'); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, CJ., in which
Black, Douglas, and Whittaker, JJ., joined) ("On the few occasions this Court has had to consider
the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusualness do not seem to have
been drawn."); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) ("We choose to draw no
significant distinction between the word 'cruel' and the word 'unusual' in the Eighth Amendment.").
But see Furman, 408 U.S at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring); hi. at 309 (Stewart, L, concurring)
(suggesting that the term "unusual" does have significance).
74. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447-49 (prohibiting torture and inhuman and barbarous
punishments but upholding electrocution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878)
(prohibiting torture and unnecessary cruelty but upholding the firing squad).
75. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
76. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
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Reliance on the framers' intent was quicldy supplemented, in
Weems v. United States,77 with the more flexible requirement that
punishments be compatible with society's evolving standards of
decency.78 Under this standard, the state must respect human
dignity and remain within civilized standards in imposing
punishments. 79 The Supreme Court has determined that society's
standards of decency prohibit punishments that involve unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain, 0 and punishments that are grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.
8 '
One early case that illustrated the meaning of unnecessary and
wanton pain was Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber.82 In
Resweber, the Court held that it was not unconstitutional to subject
a prisoner to a second electrocution after the first failed to execute
77. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
78. Id at 378 (stating that the Eighth Amendment "may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice"). A later Court interpreting Weems stated that "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, CJ.,
in which Black, Douglas, and Whittaker, JJ, joined). Butsee Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680,
2686-96 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J., in which Rehnquist, CJ., joined) (analyzing the case in terms
of original intent); John C. Shawde, Note, Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis,
38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 357, 371 (1984) (arguing that evolving standards are unknowable standards).
The Court has stated that in determining whether a punishment violates societal values, judges
should look primarily to objective indicators and must not rely upon their own subjective views.
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,274-75 (1980) (plurality opinion of White, Stewart, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). For example, in a decision determining
whether capital punishment for certain crimes violated societal values, the Court looked to history,
the actions of state legislatures, and jury sentences. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-87 (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
79. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion of Warren, CJ., in which Black, Douglas, and
Whittaker, JJ. joined).
80. The Court further described unnecessary and wanton pain as "pain that lacks penological
justification." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
81. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The "grossly
disproportionate" test originated in Weems v. United States where the court held that a 15-year
sentence of hard labor was disproportionate to the offense of falsifying a public record. Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380 (1910); see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 295-303 (1983)
(reaffirming the Eighth Amendment's proscription of sentences disproportionate to the crime
committed, and holding the life imprisonment without parole was significantly disproportionate to
the crime of uttering a "no account" check for $100). But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct.
2680, 2686 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, I., in which Relnquist, CJ., joined) (stating that the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee).
82. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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him due to a malfunction in the electric chair.83 According to the
Resweber Court, an unforeseeable accident is not cruel because
there is no purposeful or wanton infliction of unnecessary pain. 4
The Court declared that the result would not differ had the prisoner
experienced the pain in any other occurrence, suchas a fire in the
cell block 85 This dictum was the Supreme Court's first indication
that the Eighth Amendment applied to prison conditions.
I. THE UNIED STATES SUPREMB COURT'S
PRISON CONDmONS CASES
The Supreme Court has consistently limited application of the
Eighth Amendment to criminal cases after a person has been
convicted. 6 In contrast to its recent review of prison conditions
suits, the Court previously reviewed only cases where criminal
sentences, or the means of carrying out those sentences, were
challenged under the Eighth Amendment."7 For example, the
83. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463 (plurality opinion of Reed, J. in which Vinson, CJ., Black, and
Jackson, JJ., joined).
84. Id at 463-64 (plurality opinion of Reed, J. in which Vinson, CJ., Black, and Jackson, JL,
joined).
85. I at 464 (plurality opinion of Reed, . in which Vinson, C.J., Black, and Jackson, JJ.,
joined).
86. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977); iU at 671 n.40 ("Eighth Amendment
scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions."); see Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 176
(W.D. Pa. 1965) (stating that "'punishment" in the Eighth Amendment refers to "a penalty inflicted
by a judicial tribunal in accordance with law in retribution for criminal conduct"), aff'd, 379 F.2d
213 (3d Cir. 1967); Hill v. State, 168 S.E.2d 327,330 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that maltreatment
and abuse of a person during pretrial detention by custodial officials is not within the Eighth
Amendment because its provisions "have relation to punishment imposed by sentences on conviction
for criminal offenses").
87. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court reviewed public shooting"8 and electrocution 9 as
means of execution, as well as the death sentence itself."
When lower courts abandoned the hands-off doctrine, their
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment expanded to include
prisoners' suits involving both the circumstances of the prison
environment and the conduct of prison officials. 9' The Supreme
Court subsequently followed suit and, in a series of opinions,
examined the constitutionality of depriving prisoners of their
medical needs,' housing two prisoners in a single cell,93 and
injuring inmates in a prison disturbance.' These cases raised two
central questions. First, what was the proper Eighth Amendment
standard for evaluating the constitutionality of prison conditions?
95
Second, when inmates alleged multiple unconstitutional conditions,
88. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,134-35 (1878) (holding that public shooting was not
a cruel and unusual punishment).
89. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,449 (1890) (holding that electrocution was not a cruel
and unusual punishment).
90. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,187 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J3.)
(holding that the death sentence was not a cruel and unusual punishment per se). Other Eighth
Amendment cases include: Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren,
CJ., in which Black, Douglas, and Whittaker, JJ., joined) (holding that denationalization is a cruel
and unusual punishment); Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (plurality
opinion of Reed, J. in which Vinson, CJ., Black, and Jackson, 33., joined) (holding that a second
electrocution after the first failed to execute prisoner due to a malfunction was not a cruel and
unusual punishment).
91. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,581 (8th Cir. 1968) (granting injunctive relief
and prohibiting the use of the strap as punishment); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328-31 (M.D.
Ala. 1976) (interpreting conditions of confinement as subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny and
ordering prison officials to satisfy specified minimum standards), af 'd and remanded, Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 648 (ED. Va. 1971) (approving injunctive relief against
prison officials to protect prisoners from unconstitutional practices), opinion supplemented by 354
F. Supp. 1302 (ED. Va. 1973); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (ED. Ark. 1970)
(interpreting the Eighth Amendment to apply to prison conditions and practices as well as punishment
directed at prisoners as individuals), aff'd and cause remanded, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); see
also supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text (describing examples of unconstitutional prison
practices).
92. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
93. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
94. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685
(1978) ("Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny
under Eighth Amendment standards.").
95. See infra notes 97-137 and accompanying text (discussing various interpretations of the
standard).
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should courts consider the cumulative effects of some or all prison
conditions or should they review each condition individually? 96 A
discussion of these questions follows.
A. Transformation of the Eighth Amendment Standard
The Supreme Court decided its first prison conditions case,
Estelle v. Gamble, in 1976.97 Estelle involved a single condition:
the adequacy of a prisoner's medical treatment.98 In Estelle, an
inmate of the Texas Department of Corrections hurt his back when
a bale of cotton fell on him while he was unloading a truck.99 The
inmate brought a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming
that the prison doctors failed to diagnose or treat his back injury
adequately.'00 The district court dismissed his complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 101 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with
instructions to reinstate the complaint, holding that the alleged
insufficiency of medical treatment stated a valid claim.1 2 The
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals's decision with
respect to the prison's medical director and remanded for an
evaluation of the other defendants, holding that only deliberate
indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's serious injury
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.0 3
The Estelle Court asserted that the government has an
obligation to provide medical care for prisoners. 1°4 Recognizing
the concerns of its early Eighth Amendment cases, I° the Court
96. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text (discussing courts, various approaches to
cases involving multiple conditions).
97. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court's statement in Resweber that accidents or occurrences in
prison were not cruel was merely dictum. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing
the Resweber decision).
98. EsTeile, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
99. Id. at 99.
100. Id. at 107.
101. Id. at 99.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 106-08.
104. Id. at 103.
105. Id. (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890)).
289
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
observed that denial of medical needs may result in torture or at
least pain and suffering without any penological purpose."°6
However, relying on Resweber, the Estelle Court found that
suffering resulting from an accident is not a wanton infliction of
unnecessary pain.1 7 The Court in Estelle noted modem
legislation codifying the common law view that the public must
care for prisoners because they cannot care for themselves'0 8 and
concluded that society's contemporary standards of decency require
a prisoner to show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent
to the prisoner's serious medical needs to establish an Eighth
Amendment violation. 19 Thus, the Court fashioned a standard that
revolves around prison officials' state of mind.110
In 1981 the Supreme Court considered for the first time a
genuine issue regarding whether general conditions of confinement
in prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment.' The Court
in Rhodes v. Chapman"' held that the practice of housing two
inmates in a single cell was not unconstitutional. 3 Rhodes
involved two inmates of an Ohio prison, suing on behalf of all
others similarly situated, who claimed that double-ceiling
106. Id
107. Id at 105.
108. Id. at 103-04; see id. at 103 n.8 (listing state statutes codifying the common law view that
the public is required to care for prisoners).
109. Id at 106. The Court stated that the indifference may be manifested by prison doctors'
response to a prisoner's needs, or by prison guards' intentional denial of or interference with medical
care. Id. at 104-05. The facts of the prisoner's complaint in this case, however, did not suggest such
indifference on the part of the prison doctors. Id. at 107-08. The Court noted that the prisoner had
been seen by medical personnel 17 times in a three-month period, and that the doctors' failure to
administer an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques was a matter of medical judgment. Id, at 107.
The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether a there was a cause of action against
other prison officials. Id, at 108.
110. See id at 106 (requiring deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs).
111. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1981). A genuine issue regarding whether
prison conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment did not arise in the Court's previous
prison conditions cases of Etele v. Gamble orHutto v. Finney. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
98 (1976) (reviewing the district court's sua sponte dismissal of a prisoner's complaint on summary
judgment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (where it was not disputed that the conditions
in the Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
112. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
113. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
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constituted cruel and unusual punishment.114 The prison housed
38% more inmates than its design capacity allowed, and more than
half of those inmates were double-celled in 63-square-foot
cells.
115
The federal district court, relying upon objective studies
recommending cells with at least 50 to 55 square feet per prisoner,
concluded that double ceiling was cruel and unusual punishment
because the inmates were serving long terms of imprisonment, they
were spending most of their time in their cells, and they would
continue to be double-celled because it was a permanent
practice. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed,1 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the district court's considerations were insufficient to support its
conclusion.
118
In evaluating whether the prison conditions were cruel and
unusual, the Supreme Court restated its view that society's evolving
standards of decency prohibit punishments that inflict unnecessary
and wanton pain, and punishments that are grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the crime." 9 After examining the objective
factors the district court had relied upon, the Rhodes Court
concluded that double-ceiling did not increase violence or lead to
deprivations of basic food, medical care, or sanitation, and
therefore did not inflict the requisite pain or grossly
disproportionate punishment.12 According to the iCourt, the
Constitution does not require comfortable prisons or direct that
prisoners be free from discomfort.'
The Court's analysis in Rhodes differed from that of Estelle in
that it did not consider the state of mind of the prison officials, but
114. IAt at 340.
115. Maat 341-43.
116. Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 P. Supp. 1007,1020-21 (S.D. Oh. 1977), aff'd without opinion,
624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
117. Chapman v. Rhodes, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980) (without opinion), rev'd, Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
118. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981).
119. Id at347.
120. Id at 348.
121. Id at 349.
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rather only the conditions of the prison. " As a result of the
Court's focus on objective conditions, many lower courts inferred
that the Eighth Amendment required no mental element when
general prison conditions were at issue."z Other courts, however,
continued to believe that the deliberate indifference standard of
Estelle applied in all prison conditions cases.'24 Thus, the Rhodes
decision created much ambiguity in prison conditions analysis
under the Eighth Amendment.'25
Five years later, in Whitley v. Albers,126 the Supreme Court
failed to resolve the uncertainty. The Whitley opinion did, however,
reformulate the unnecessary and wanton pain standard by
interpreting it to require different culpable states of mind on the
part of prison officials depending on the type of prison conduct
involved. 127
In Whitley, a prison officer was taken hostage in an upper-tier
cell during an inmate riot in the Oregon State Penitentiary.
128
Prison officials devised a plan to free the hostage, in which one
officer would climb the stairs toward the cell, and another would
shoot low at any prisoners who followed him.1 29 During the
122. See id. at 348 (ruling that the objective prison conditions did not constitute unnecessary
and wanton pain).
123. See, e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418,426 (3d Cir. 1990) (failing to consider a mental
element in its Eighth Amendment analysis); Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 54-55 (5th Cit. 1987)
(declining to adopt a "malicious and sadistic" intent standard); Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47,
50 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (interpreting Rhodes not to require intent in a cause of action alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement), reinstated inpart en bane, 858 F.2d 1101,1103 (5th Cir.
1988); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that conditions constituted
cruel and unusual punishment without considering a mental element), cert denied, 479 U.S. 817
(1986); Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conditions
constituted cruel and unusual punishment without considering a mental element).
124. See, e.g., Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1990); Givens v. Jones, 900
F.2d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 1990); Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st
Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988); Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057-58
(1987); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987); Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147
& n.8 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying the deliberate indifference standard).
125. S ee infra notes 139-55 and accompanying text (discussing further conflicting lower court
interpretations of the objective standard).
126. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
127. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. The Court attempted to clarify the unnecessary and wanton
standard by describing it as "wanton and obdurate." Id. at 320.
128. Id. at 314-15.
129. Id at 316.
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execution of the plan, several inmates were wounded by
gunshots. 13° A prisoner who was shot in the knee sued the
assistant superintendent of the prison, among others, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the officers' conduct violated the Eighth
Amendmentl
3
The Whitley Court held that the shooting did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. 132 According to the Court, since
restoring order during a prison disturbance threatens the safety of
both inmates and prison officials, unnecessary and wanton pain in
this context means that force may not be applied "maliciously and
sadistically," but must be used in a good-faith effort to restore
order.1 33 The Court in Whitley rejected the deliberate indifference
standard of Estelle, maintaining that it did not adequately reflect
the importance of safety risks to prison personnel or the pressure
of the situation confronting prison officials."t
Whitley established the framework for analyzing whether prison
personnel's conduct violates the cruel and unusual punishment
provision of the Eighth Amendment. The general unnecessary and
wanton pain standard controls, but it is defined more specifically
depending on the particular prison conduct involved and the
importance of competing governmental interests.135 Under the
Whitley standard, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if
they are deliberately indifferent to prisoners' serious medical needs
(as in Estelle), or if they are malicious and sadistic in the
enforcement of prison security (as in Whitley).136 However, the
Whitley framework purported to classify only prison conduct.
1 37
It failed to resolve the ambiguity that the Rhodes decision created
130. 1,
131. Id. at 317.
132. Id at 326.
133. Id, at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cerz denied sub
nom John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
134. Id. at 320. The Court stated that "in making and carrying out decisions involving the use
of force to restore order in the face of a prison disturbane, prison officials undoubtedly must take
into account the very real threats the unrest presents to inmates and prison officials alike, in addition
to the possible harms to inmates against whom force might be used." Id
135. Id.
136. Id
137. Id. at 319.
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regarding what state of mind, ff any, applies when general
conditions of confinement are at issue and not a particular official's
conduct.
B. Application of the Eighth Amendment Standard to Prison
Conditions
The second problem peculiar to prison condition cases is how
to apply the Eighth Amendment standard when multiple conditions
of confinement are involved, as opposed to a single condition of
confinement or an official's conduct. For example, prisoners may
complain that conditions such as overcrowding, insufficient
exercise, inadequate sanitation, poor ventilation, or lack of heat,
produce cruel and unusual punishment in combination.'
Courts usually analyze these cases in one of three ways. First,
some courts ask whether each specific condition is cruel and
unusual. 39  This analysis has been labeled "discrete
adjudication."'" Second, other courts look to the "totality of the
conditions" and ask whether all the conditions, when combined,
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.141 The third analysis, a
138. See generally Ira P. Robbins & Michael B. Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison
Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke, 29 STAN. L. Rnv. 893, 909-14 (1977) (discussing the
most common conditions of confinement subject to litigation).
139. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416,418-21 (6th Cir.) (analyzing specific conduct
by prison officials and rejecting applicability of their cumulative effect), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845
(1984); Hite v. Leeke, 564 F.2d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the totality of conditions
approach was inappropriate where overcrowding was not combined with unsanitary conditions or
physical danger); Carver v. Knox County, 753 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (requiring a
specific condition on which to base an Eighth Amendment claim and rejecting the totality of
conditions approach); cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541-60 (1979) (illustrating the discrete
adjudication approach in the Fifth Amendment due process context by considering conditions
individually).
140. See Groseclose v. Dutton, 609 F. Supp. 1432, 1441 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Dawson v.
Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1285 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (discussing the "discrete adjudication"
method of analysis); Note, Complex Enforcement: UnconstitutionalPrison Conditions, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 626, 628-30 (1981) (calling this analysis "discrete adjudication" for the first time).
141. See, e.g., Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1985) (requiring consideration
of the totality of circumstances and a specific unconstitutional condition for a valid Eighth
Amendment claim); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741,751 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that the totality of
circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1977)
(adopting the totality of conditions test and not requiring a specific deprivation); Gates v. Collier, 501
F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974) (adopting the totality of conditions test and not requiring a specific
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hybrid of the previous two, takes the point of view that certain
related conditions may be considered in combination, while others
must be considered alone. 42 For example, a court may consider
the lack of sufficient blankets for prisoners and inadequate heating
in combination because the two conditions are related, while in
another case the court will consider insufficient blankets and poor
sanitation separately because they are unrelated.
The Supreme Court's past cases have not explicitly
distinguished between these analyses. In its 1978 case of Hutto v.
Finney,'43 the Court seemed to adopt the totality of the conditions
test.'44 In Hutto, a federal district court's finding that the
conditions in the Arkansas prison system were cruel and unusual
was not disputed. 145 The Supreme Court in Hutto did, however,
briefly review the factors that the district court considered in
deprivation); Kitt v. Ferguson, 750 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (D. Neb. 1990) (adopting the totality of
circumstances test but not finding a constitutional violation), ajfd without opinion, 950 F.2d 725 (8th
Cir. 1991); Reece v. Gragg, 650 F. Supp. 1297, 1303-04 (D. Kan. 1986) (finding the totality of
circumstances unconstitutional); Miles v. Bell, 621 F. Supp. 51, 58 & n.10 (D. Conn. 1985)
(considering conditions individually and in their totality); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052,
1122 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (considering the totality of conditions but requiring a specific
unconstitutional condition for an Eighth Amendment violation); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp.
269, 322-23 (D. N.H. 1977) (stating that the cumulative effect of prison conditions may be cruel and
unusual without a single unconstitutional condition); Vest v. Lubbock County Comm'rs Court, 444
F. Supp. 824, 831 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (stating that the sum total of prison conditions may be cruel and
unusual without an individual unconstitutional condition); Barnes v. Government of Virgin Islands,
415 F. Supp. 1218, 1225 (D. V.L 1976) (stating that the cumulative effect of prison conditions may
be cruel and unusual without a single unconstitutional condition).
142. See, e.g., Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,1107 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that related
conditions are those that combine to create a cruel and unusual punishment), cer. denied, 481 U.S.
1069 (1987); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1140 n.98 (5th Cir.) (combining conditions of
confnement in some circumstances), amended in part vacated in part, reh'g denied inpart, 688 F.2d
266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1247 (9th
Cir. 1982) (requiring joint consideration of related conditions); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp.
1252,1285 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (considering some conditions individually and some in combination).
This test will be referred to as the "combination of conditions" test.
143. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
144. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 687-88; see infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the Hutto
Court's holding). Hutto was the culmination of the litigation surrounding the Arkansas prison system
described above in Holt v. Sarver. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing Holt
v. Sarver).
145. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 680. Prison officials contested only the district court's decision to limit
punitive isolation to 30 days, and its award of attorneys' fees in response to the officials' failure to
remedy the constitutional violations. IL
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finding a constitutional violation.1" These factors included the
inmates' inadequate diet, overcrowding, widespread violence,
unprofessional security personnel, and the length of time inmates
spent in isolation.147 The Supreme Court appeared to accept the
totality of conditions test because it stated that "taken as a whole"
it found no error in the district court's determination that conditions
in the isolation cells were unconstitutional and that the court's
order was supported by the "interdependence" of the
conditions.
14 9
More recently, in Rhodes v. Chapman,"19 the Court stated that
conditions of confinement could be unconstitutional "alone or in
combination." '15 This phrase could encompass all three possible
approaches mentioned above." The Rhodes Court refused,
however, to hold that double-ceiling in combination with any other
conditions was unconstitutional.5"
Since the Rhodes decision, lower courts have generally applied
either the totality of conditions test or the combination of
conditions test.153 But even courts that applied the totality of
conditions test interpreted it in different ways. Some courts held
that the totality of the conditions can constitute cruel and unusual
punishment even ff no single condition is unconstitutional,154
146. Id at 687.
147. Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 277-78 (ED. Ark. 1976).
148. Huno, 437 U.S. at 687-88.
149. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
150. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.
151. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (describing the differing analyses of
multiple conditions of confinement). Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, interpreted the
Court's statement as adopting the "totality of the conditions" test to which he subscribed because
he believed the cumulative effect of conditions may be cruel and unusual Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 363
& n.10 (Brennan, 1., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lasman v. Halgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269,
322-23 (D. N.H. 1977)).
152. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
153. See supra notes 141-42 (citing cases applying the totality of conditions and combination
of conditions tests).
154. See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741,751 & n.12 (5th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Sullivan,
553 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1977); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974); Kitt v.
Ferguson, 750 F. Supp. 1014,1019 (D. Neb. 1990); Reece v. Gragg, 650 F. Supp. 1297,1303-04 (D.
Kan. 1986); Miles v. Bell, 621 F. Supp. 51, 58 n.10 (D. Conn. 1985); Iaaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.
Supp. 269,322-23 (D. N.H. 1977); Vest v. Lubbock County Comm'rs Court, 444 F. Supp. 824,831
(N.D. Tex. 1977); Barnes v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1225 (D. VI. 1976) (not
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while other courts required at least one specific condition to be
unconstitutional."' Thus, the precise analysis required in cases
alleging multiple unconstitutional conditions was uncertain.
To recapitulate, the Supreme Court's prison cases before Wilson
v. Seiter'56 exhibited two ambiguities. First, did the Eighth
Amendment contain a state of mind requirement for prison
conditions cases? Whitley clarified the constitutional analysis where
unconstitutional conduct was alleged, stating that conduct that
inflicts "unnecessary or wanton pain" is cruel and unusual
punishment.' 57 The meaning of this standard depends upon the
conduct involved and the governmental interests at stake. 5 ' But
lower courts were split on how this test applied to cases involving
conditions of confinement.'59 Second, how should multiple prison
conditions be analyzed? The Supreme Court's previous cases left
it unclear whether multiple conditions should be considered
individually, in their totality, or in combination at the court's
discretion." Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court's most recent
prison conditions case, resolved both of these ambiguities.' 6'
IV. THE CASE OF WILsoN V. SEITER
A. The Facts
In Wilson v. Seiter,"2 Pearly L. Wilson, a felon imprisoned
at the Hocking Correctional Facility in Nelsonville, Ohio, brought
an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Ohio
requiring a specific unconstitutional condition).
155. See, e.g., Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920,925 (6th Cir. 1985); Gnibbs v. Bradley, 552
F. Supp. 1052, 1122 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (requiring a specific unconstitutional condition).
156. III S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
157. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,320 (1986); see supra notes 126-37 and accompanying
text (discussing the Whitley decision).
158. Whley, 475 U.S. at 320.
159. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing the split of authority).
160. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the various analyses of
multiple conditions of confinement).
161. See infra notes 162-204 and accompanying text (discussing the Wilson decision).
162. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
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prison officials violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.6 3 The complaint alleged overcrowding, excessive
noise, insufficient locker storage space, inadequate heating and
cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms,
unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with
mentally and physically ill inmates.'" Wilson sought declaratory
163. Wilson, 111 5. Ct. at 2322-23.
164. I at 2322-23. Petitioner made the following allegations:
Ventilation
The air in the dormitory is stagnant and foul from toilets, urinals and colostomy
bags. It is difficult to sleep at night because of this foul air. In summer, the temperature
goes up to 95% and this heat is aggravated by the lack of ventilation and the fact that fire
exits are locked at all times. The fans in the dormitories are inadequate to move the foul
air out. As a result of the heat some prisoners "[fall] out" (faint). Prisoners with
respiratory problems have trouble breathing; others develop heat rash.
Sanitarion
Urine accumulates around the toilets and urinal and is inadequately cleaned, resulting
in offensive odor, floors are filthy because of lack of proper cleaning supplies. The
dormitory is infested with a variety of insects and mice, and extermination is totally
inadequate. The dining hall is filthy and the food is prepared by unsupervised, sometimes
diseased prisoners. As a result, petitioner fears to cat in the dining halL
Overcrowding
There are 143 beds in the dormitory; all but twenty eight of the beds are double-
bunked. Prisoners have less than 50 square feet per person. The beds are spaced so closely
that, with the inadequate ventilation, prisoners smell the body odors of others. The general
noise level is high, even during sleeping hours.
Lack of Heat
The dormitory is "frigid" in winter, causing petitioner physical pain. There are
cracks in the walls that can be seen through. Most of the windows cannot be closed
completely, so that some bunks get wet during the rain. The clothing is ragged and
inadequate to keep prisoners warm in winter, no underwear is distributed.
Safety Protection from Communicable Disease
Psychotic prisoners are placed in the dormitories. This causes stress to other
prisoners, who cannot predict the behavior of the mentally ill prisoners. Following
surgery, prisoners with open sores are housed in the dormitory because of a lack of space
in the prison infirmary. One named prisoner housed in the dormitory was repeatedly
hospitalized for pneumonia.
298
1992 /Wilson v. Seiter
and injunctive relief, as well as $900,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages."c  The district court granted summary
judgment against Wilson, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the prison officials
exhibited no "persistent malicious cruelty" as required by
Whitley.16 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the court of appeals's judgment by a five to four vote, and
remanded the case for reconsideration with the deliberate
indifference standard of Estelle v. Gamble. 67
B. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
joined.168 The majority began its opinion by stating that the
Eighth Amendment, through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the states from inflicting cruel
and unusual punishment upon prisoners, including deprivations not
specifically part of the sentence, such as prison conditions.169
The majority noted that the determination that a prison official
has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment requires an inquiry into
the official's state of mind.170 The majority supported this
assertion by reviewing its decisions in Resweber, Estelle, and
Whitley, which applied the wanton infliction of pain standard.17
Brief of Petitioner at 4 n.3, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 89-7376).
165. Wilson, 111 S. CL at 2323.
166. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F. 2d 861, 867 (6th Cir.), motion granted and cert granted, 111 S.
CL 41, motion granted, 111 S. CL 577 (1990), vacated, 111 S. CL 2321 (1991).
167. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (1991).
168. Id. at 2322.
169. Il at 2323. The Court relied upon Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). Id
170. Id, at 2324.
171. See id. at 2323-24 (discussing the Resweber, Estelle, and Whitley cases); see also Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1985); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (plurality opinion
of Reed, J. in which Vinson, CJ., Black, and Jackson, JJ., joined) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)); Louisiana ex ret Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment to require a wanton
infliction of pain). The majority explained that in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), the
majority did not consider the issue of whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind because the holding turned on the preliminary question of whether the deprivation was
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Since "wantonness" involves a mental element, inquiry into an
inflicting official's state of mind is required. 172 Moreover, the
source of the state of mind requirement, according to the majority,
is the text of the Eighth Amendment itself which prohibits
"punishment," a concept that implies a deliberate intent to chastise
or deter. 17' Thus, some mental element must be attributed to an
official to constitute "punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment.174 The mental element may be satisfied by the
deliberate imposition of punishment by a statute or sentencing
judge, or by a prison official's conduct.
75
Having decided that some mental element is required for Eighth
Amendment prison conditions claims, the majority next determined
which specific state of mind was required. 176  The majority
concluded that "wantonness" is the required state of mind in all
prison conditions cases.'" However, relying upon Whitley, the
Wilson Court explained that the meaning of wantonness depends
upon the type of conduct at issue and the constraints facing prison
officials in the particular circumstances. 8 For example, in an
emergency situation, such as a prison riot, wantonness means
acting maliciously and sadistically with the purpose of causing
harm. 79 This standard allows wide latitude for behavior to take
into account the high pressure of the situation facing prison
officials and the need to protect the safety of prison staff and
inmates.180 Where conduct relating to a prisoner's medical needs
sufficiently serious. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324.
172. Wilson, 111 S. CL at 2324.
173. Id at 2325 (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986)). The United States argued that a state of mind inquiry might allow
prison officials the defense that they lacked the requisite intent because fiscal constraints beyond their
control caused the inhumane conditions. Id at 2326. The majority responded that the meaning of
-'punishment" in the Eighth Amendment must control despite these policy considerations. Id
174. Id, at 2325.
175. Id
176. Id. at 2326-27.
177. Id at 2326.
178. Id
179. Id (quoting Wit/ey v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-321 (1985), quoting Johnson v. Glick,
481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cer. denied sub nor. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
180. Id (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21).
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is at issue, wantonness means "deliberate indifference."8 ' The
deliberate indifference standard is less demanding because
attending to prisoners' medical needs does not generally conflict
with other equally important governmental obligations. 8 2 The
majority concluded, therefore, that since there is no significant
distinction between inadequate medical care and other conditions
of confinement, such as the food served, the clothes issued, or the
temperature maintained in the prison, prison conditions cases
should be judged by the deliberate indifference standard." 3 Since
the constraints facing officials regarding these conditions are
similar (in contrast to the constraints posed by a riot), the
deliberate indifference standard applies to all the conditions.'84
The majority next addressed how to apply the deliberate
indifference standard when multiple prison conditions are at
issue."' The majority stated that conditions are unconstitutional
individually or in combination only when there is a deprivation of
an identifiable human need. 8 ' Examples of human needs include
food, warmth, and exercise."a Overall conditions can constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, the Wilson majority asserted, only
if there is a specific deprivation of a human need."18
In sum, the Wilson majority decided that there is an Eighth
Amendment violation in any prison conditions case only if a prison
official was deliberately indifferent to the deprivation of an
inmate's human need. 9 The majority finally remanded the case
for reconsideration under the deliberate indifference standard.'O
181. Id. (relying upon Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
182. Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2327.
185. Id. at 2327-28.
186. Id. at 2327. This is the majority's interpretation of the statement in Rhodes that conditions
of confinement alone or in combination may deprive prisoners of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities. Id.; see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
187. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court did not exhaustively define "human need.- See
infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (discussing interpretations of human needs).
188. Wilson, 111. CL at 2327.
189. d.
190. ld. at 2328.
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C. The Concurring Opinion
Justice White, writing for himself and Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, concurred in the judgment.19' Justice
White argued that a determination of a prison official's mental state
is not required under Eighth Amendment analysis of prison
conditions because prison conditions are part of the punishment,
even though they are not expressly imposed by a statute or
judge.
192
In support of his assertion, Justice White focused on the
Supreme Court's past cases of Hutto v. Finney and Rhodes v.
Chapman.93 In both of these cases, he argued, confinement in a
prison was treated as a form of punishment.' 94 Furthermore, each
case examined only the objective severity of conditions in its
Eighth Amendment analysis.19 J stice White distinguished the
Supreme Court's decisions in Estelle and Whitley, where the Court
had required an inquiry into the state of mind of the charged
officials,'96 by noting that those cases did not involve conditions
of confinement, but rather specific acts or omissions directed at
individual prisoners."9 For example, he stated that in Estelle the
challenge was to the allegedly inadequate delivery of medical care
to the plaintiff, not to a general lack of medical care.' 9 In
Whitley, the challenge regarded a guard's shooting of the plaintiff
during a riot.'" An intent requirement was proper in these cases
191. Id (White, J., concurring).
192. l (White, J., concurring).
193. IM. at 2328-29 (White, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 2328-30 (White, J., concurring).
195. Id at 2329-30 (White, J., concurring).
196. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,319-21 (1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-
05 (1976); see also Louisiana er rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1947) (plurality
opinion of Reed, J. in which Vinson, C.J., Black, and Jackson, J3, joined) (requiring a purposeful
or wanton infliction of unnecessary pain). See generally supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text
(discussing Resweber); supra notes 97-110 and accompanying text (discussing Estelle); supra notes
126-34 and accompanying text (discussing Whitley).
197. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
198. Id (White, J., concurring).
199. Id (White, J., concurring).
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because the specific conduct did not even purport to be
punishment.2" In contrast, according to Justice White, conditions
of confinement are part of a prisoner's punishment, and the Court's
prison conditions cases have never made intent an element of a
cause of action." 1
In addition, Justice White argued that an intent requirement is
impossible to apply in the context of prison conditions since
conditions are often the result of many officials' actions or
inactions, both inside and outside a prison, and sometimes occur
over a long period of time.2" Thus, Justice White maintained, it
is unclear whose intent should be examined. 3 Moreover, Justice
White asserted that under the deliberate indifference standard
imposed by the Wilson majority, serious deprivations of prisoners'
basic human needs will not be remedied because officials will be
able to defeat a prisoner's action simply by showing that the
conditions were not caused by a culpable official, but instead by
insufficient funding from the state legislature.
204
V. RAmI CAnONS
A. A Framework for Analyzing Eighth Amendment Prison Cases
One of Wilson's most significant features is its synthesis of the
Supreme Court's previous Eighth Amendment prison cases. In the
course of reviewing its past decisions, the Court established a
framework for analyzing all Eighth Amendment prison claims.
20 5
According to Wilson, the Eighth Amendment has objective and
subjective components, both of which are necessary for an Eighth
Amendment violation.2" The objective component requires that
200. Md (White, J., concurring) (quoting Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47,50 (5th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam), reinstated in part en banc, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988)).
201. Id at 2328, 2330 (White, J., concurring).
202. L at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
203. lad (White, J., concurring).
204. IL at 2330-31 (White, J., concurring).
205. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324-26.
206. Ia at 2324 (stating that Rhodes, which turned on the objective component, did not
eliminate the required subjective component).
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a deprivation be sufficiently serious or harmful to be cruel and
unusual.2" Relying on Rhodes, the Court stated that a deprivation
is sufficiently serious ff it denies human needs or minimal civilized
necessities."' The subjective component insures that the
deprivation a prisoner suffers constitutes punishment.2 0 The
concept of punishment requires that a deprivation be inflicted with
some form of intent.10 Clearly, a deprivation formally imposed
by a statute or sentencing judge satisfies this requirement.21 Pain
inflicted by prison officials requires a wanton state of mind on the
part of the officials to qualify as punishment.2 2 But the definition
of wantonness, according to the Wilson majority, varies with the
constraints facing prison officials in particular prison contexts.
213
For example, in prison conditions cases wantonness means
deliberate indifference,214 while in emergency situations involving
prison disturbances, wantonness means a malicious and sadistic
infliction of pain.215 It makes sense to have a higher standard for
punishment when an official acts to quell a prison disturbance
because under these circumstances it is likely that the official is not
inflicting pain with the intent to punish, but to maintain prison
security.
While the members of the Court, all agree that the Eighth
Amendment contains both subjective and objective components,
they disagree about how this structure is applied. In Wilson, for
example, four Justices concurred in the judgment, contending that
the Eighth Amendment does not require an inquiry into an
207. Id at 2324, 2325 & n.2, 2326.
208. Id at 2324; see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (requiring a serious
deprivation of a basic human need or a deprivation of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities for an Eighth Amendment violation).
209. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325 (stating that the Eighth Amendment concept of punishment
requires that some mental element be attributed to the inflicting official if the pain a prisoner suffers
is not formally meted out).
210. Id.; see The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L REV. 177, 242
n.52 (1991) (citing commentators arguing that the concept of punishment implies an intentional act).
211. Wilson, II1 S. Ct. at 2325.
212. Id at 2326.
213. Id
214. Id at 2327; see infra note 251 and accompanying text (defining the deliberate indifference
standard).
215. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
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official's state of mind in challenges to conditions of
confinement.216 The extent of the disagreement on the Court
regarding the proper Eighth Amendment analysis became striking
in Hudson v. McMillian,217 the Court's most recent Eighth
Amendment case.
In Hudson, the majority held that when prison officials use
malicious and sadistic force against a prisoner, courts need not
inquire into whether the force was sufficiently harmful as long as
the force used was not de minimis.218 This holding suggests that
the Eighth Amendment's subjective and objective requirements are
interdependent and analogous to a sliding scale, at least in the
excessive force context.219 A particularly culpable mental state on
the part of the inflicting officer can compensate for a less serious
injury and still violate the Eighth Amendment. The Hudson
dissenters, Justices Thomas and Scalia, argued that allowing all but
a de minimis use of force to satisfy the objective component
eliminates the Eighth Amendment's serious injury requirement
mentioned in Wilson.220
The dispute in Hudson centers around what constitutes a serious
injury under the Eighth Amendment's objective component. The
Hudson majority held that the concept depends on all the
circumstances of the claim at issue including the inflicting official's
state of mind.2' The dissenters suggested that the amount of pain
a prisoner suffers is the controlling factor.2 2
Wilson and Hudson illustrate that the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment framework is tremendously flexible. The standards
under the subjective and objective components vary with the
216. Wilson, 11 IS. Ct. at 2330 (concurring opinion of White, J., in which Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens, 1J. joined).
217. 112 S. CL 995 (1992).
218. Hudson, 112 S. CL at 1000.
219. See id (limiting the Court's holding to the excessive force context).
220. Id at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324 (stating that the
objective component determines whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious).
221. Hudson, 112 S. Ct at 1000.
222. See id. at 1009 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183
(7th Cir. 1088)) (stating that a serious injury need not be physical since many things can cause agony
and pain).
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aspects of prison life and the specific claims at issue. When added
to the sharp disparity of opinions on the Court, this variability
presages much uncertainty for future Eighth Amendment litigation.
B. The "Single Deprivation of a Human Need" Requirement:
Resolution of the Totality of the Conditions Ambiguity
Prison conditions cases have presented a special problem for
lower courts. Before Wilson, there was considerable conflict among
lower courts regarding how to analyze multiple conditions of
confinement under the Eighth Amendment. 3 Wilson does not
overrule the diverse analyses lower courts developed. Courts are
still free to consider conditions individually, in their totality, or in
combination. But after Wilson their inquiries must focus on whether
prisoners have been deprived of a human need.22 Wilson rejects
the idea that overall conditions of confinement, without a specific
deprivation of a human need, can constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.' Thus, the Wilson decision focuses the complex
and conflicting legal analyses of many jurisdictions on the heart of
what it. means to inflict cruel and unusual conditions of
confinement: to deprive an inmate of a human need. 6
The Wilson Court did not set forth a rule for determining what
is a human need. Although the Court refers to the equally
ambiguous "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," the
Court leaves these concepts for a case-by-case determination." 7
However, lower courts have much experience in determining
minimally acceptable conditions and have declared many prison
223. See supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text (discussing various analyses of multiple
conditions of confinement).
224. See Wl9son, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 (requiring a deprivation of a human need to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment).
225. See id at 2327 (requiring a specific deprivation of a human need for conditions to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
226. Id; see supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text (discussing the differing approaches
to conditions of confinement cases).
227. Wilson, 111 S. CL at 2327; see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,347 (1981) (requiring
a serious deprivation of a basic human need or a deprivation of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities for an Eighth Amendment violation).
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conditions unconstitutional.' Not surprisingly, human needs
generally relate to the core areas of the penal environment which
include shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, and medical
care.229 Over time, trial court determinations of what constitutes
a human need will enable prison officials and state legislators to
anticipate constitutionally acceptable standards with greater
certainty.
C. Prison Conditions as Punishment
The Wilson majority and the Wilson concurrence both agreed
that pain or suffering imposed as punishment by a statute or judge
is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny without any additional
inquiry into intent.23 ' They also agreed that Estelle and Whitley
properly required a culpable state of mind on the part of prison
officials, since the pain the officials inflicted was not imposed as
punishment.23 However, the majority and the concurrence
disagreed about whether pain resulting from prison conditions
constitutes punishment. The majority argued that since the concept
of punishment implies an intentional act, some mental element
must be attributed to the inflicting prison official for prison
conditions to constitute punishment. 2  The concurrence
228. See Robbins & Buser, supra note 138, at 909-14; William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation,
Comment Note, Prison Conditions asAmounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.IR.3d 111
(1973 & Supp. 1992) (citing cases declaring prison conditions unconstitutional).
229. See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating that the core areas of
Eighth Amendment claims are shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, and medical care), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). Two commentators have selected eleven foci for analyzing conditions
of confinement: physical facilities, overcrowding, absense of a classification system, isolation and
segregation cells, medical facilities and treatment, food service, personal hygiene and sanitation,
protection from violence, prison personnel, rehabilitation programs, and other prisoners' rights. See
Robbins & Buser, supra note 138, at 909-14 (citing cases examining each aspect of a prison's
conditions of confinement).
230. Wilson, 11 S. CL at 2325; id, at 2328 (White, J., concurring).
231. See id. at 2323-25 (reviewing the Estelle and Whitley cases, stating that they mandate an
inquiry into an official's state of mind if the pain is not "formally meted out as punishment")
(emphasis in original); iUi at 2330 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court made intent an
element in Estelle and Whitley because they involved conduct that did not purport to be punishment
at all).
232. Id. at 2325.
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maintained that prison conditions are impliedly part of the formally
imposed punishment.2"
The Supreme Court's prior case law does not resolve this
disagreement because it can be interpreted to support either side
depending on one's definition of "conditions of confinement." The
concurrence, for example, suggested that conditions of confinement
are general characteristics of a prison.'3 Accordingly, the
concurrence argued that Hutto and Rhodes were the Court's only
prison conditions cases and, since they did not require a mental
element, the Eighth Amendment does not require one.235 Estelle
and Whitley, which did require a mental element, were not prison
conditions cases in their view, but rather involved conduct directed
at individual prisoners.236
Yet it is equally valid, as the majority argued, to define
conditions of confinement as those characteristics of a prison that
affect an individual prisoner. 37 For example, the inmate in
Estelle who alleged he had not received adequate medical care
experienced that deprivation as a condition of his confinement, just
as the prisoner in Whitley experienced being shot. The majority
also distinguished Hutto as turning on a narrow holding,238 and
Rhodes as not reaching the consideration of the mental
element.3
Both the majority and the concurrence can distinguish opposing
cases, and under either the majority's or the concurrence's
definition of conditions of confinement, the prisoner experiences
pain as a circumstance of his incarceration in prison. Therefore, the
concurrence's distinction between pain resulting from conduct and
233. Id at 2328 (White, L, concurring).
234. See id at 2330 (White, ., concurring) (stating that since Estele did not involve a
challenge to "a general lack of access to medical care at the prison," it did not involve a challenge
to conditions of confinement).
235. See id at 2328-30 (White, ., concurring) (characterizing Hutto and Rhodes as conditions
of confinment cases and emphasizing that they focused only on the objective conditions).
236. Id at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
237. Id at 2324 n.1.
238. Id at 2325 n.2.
239. Id at 2324.
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pain resulting from conditions is a weak rationale for calling one
punishment and not the other.
Moreover, using the vague and imprecise concept of a prison
condition to determine whether circumstances of the prison
environment constitute punishment, as the concurrence suggested,
would amplify the uncertainty in prison litigation. For example, the
concurrence asserted that conduct directed at an individual prisoner
is clearly not a condition of confinement.' Thus, depriving a
single prisoner of medical care is not a condition of
confinement."4 If the deprivation of medical care pervades
throughout the prison, however, then it is a condition of
confinement.242 Where does one draw the line? Is it a condition
of confinement when dozens or hundreds of prisoners suffer a
deprivation? Since it is uncertain how many prisoners must suffer
a deprivation for there to be a condition of confinement, courts will
not know whether any deprivation constitutes punishment.
Consequently, under the concurrence's view, courts would have to
decide whether intent would be an element of a cause of action in
each case. In contrast, the majority's holding that some form of
intent is required whenever the pain inflicted is not formally
imposed by a statute or judge, 43 provides a clear, unambiguous
rule.
Finally, common sense rebels against the notion that prison
conditions are intended to be punishment. Clearly a judge does not
sentence a criminal to prison so that he will suffer from
overcrowded, unsanitary conditions. Although these conditions are
a consequence of the sentence, they lack the element of intent that
is necessary for them to be punishment. Thus, the concurrence's
argument that prison conditions are imposed as part of the
punishment is unsound.
240. Id. at 2330 (White, , concurring).
241. Id. (White, 3, concurring).
242. Id. (White, L, concurring) (implying that a general lack of access to medical care at the
prison would be a condition of confinement).
243. Id at 2325.
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D. The Deliberate Indifference Standard
1. Source of the State of Mind Requirement
Justice Scalia argued for the majority that the concept of
punishment is the source of the state of mind requirement.' The
Supreme Court's precedents, however, have consistently identified
the mental element of wantonness within the cruel and unusual
concept, not the punishment concept.245 Each of the Supreme
Court's prison conditions cases derives the element of wantonness
from the "unnecessary and wanton pain" standard first presented
in Gregg v. Georgia.246 In Gregg, the Supreme Court held that
the death penalty was not cruel and unusual.247 In interpreting the
Eighth Amendment, the Court had no reason to consider whether
the death sentence constituted punishment; that much was obvious.
Instead, the Gregg Court focused on the cruel and unusual concept
and interpreted it to prohibit unnecessary and wanton pain.24
Thus, Justice Scalia's inclusion of the state of mind element within
244. Id
245. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text (discussing the "cruel and unusual"
standard); supra notes 86-137 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's prison conditions
cases). The Court's discussion in Whitley is ambiguous regarding the source of the wantonness
requirement. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). While the Court refers to "cruel and
unusual punishment" and "the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause," it does not expressly state
whether the wantonness standard derives from the "cruel and unusual" or "punishment" aspects of
the Eighth Amendment. Id
246. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.) (recognizing the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" prohibition of the Eighth
Amendment). As support for its standard, the Court in Gregg cited Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
392-93 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (discussing the decision in Wilkerson), Wilkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130,136 (1879) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment to prohibit "unnecessary cruelty"), and
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) (prohibiting penalties unnecessary to fulfill the
purposes of punishment). Id The Supreme Court also mentioned "unnecessary pain" and "wanton
infliction of pain" in Louisiana ex reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (plurality
opinion of Reed, J. in which Vinson, CJ., Black, and Jackson, JJ., joined), but the Court has
consistently preferred to quote the standard from Gregg. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319
(1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,670 (1977)) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 103 (1976)) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.));
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,346 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting
Gregg, 429 U.S. at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
247. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
248. Id at 173 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J3.).
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the concept of punishment rather than within the cruel and unusual
concept is a subtle departure from the Court's precedents.
Since the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are
cruel and unusual, afortiori courts must find that punishment exists
before inquiring into whether that punishment is cruel and unusual.
Accordingly, the Wilson majority requires that courts first find
deliberate indifference to prison conditions before evaluating
whether those conditions deprive prisoners of basic human needs.
This distinction, while significant in theory, will have few practical
effects. The threshold consideration of whether there is punishment
will probably not result in more summary judgments against
prisoners since the inquiry into whether prison officials were
deliberately indifferent involves evaluating their mental state, and
courts generally refuse to grant summary judgment where a
defendant's state of mind is at issue.249
2. Application of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
One fundamental issue remaining after Wilson is how courts
will apply the deliberate indifference standard to prison conditions
cases. Wilson merely set forth the standard and did not address this
practical matter. Fortunately, lower courts provide helpful guidance
on this question since they have applied the deliberate indifference
standard in medical needs cases following Estelle and in cases
challenging other prison circumstances250
While formulations of the deliberate indifference standard vary,
courts generally conclude deliberate indifference exists when there
is an unreasonable risk of harm to prisoners which was known or
should have been known to prison officials, and a failure to take
249. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 866 (6th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds,
I11 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (quoting 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MnLm,, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2730, at 238 (1983)) (stating that since determining someone's state
of mind generally requires the drawing of factual inferences as to which reasonable men might differ,
that function is traditionally left to the jury).
250. See infra notes 251-62 and accompanying text (discussing cases interpreting the deliberate
indifference standard).
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reasonable steps to prevent the harm.2' Clearly courts have had
no difficulty applying this standard in cases where a specific
official's conduct inflicts the alleged cruelty. 2 In such cases, the
particular official must be shown to have been deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner's basic needs.
However, when general prison conditions are alleged to violate
the Eighth Amendment, multiple individuals may be responsible for
creating the conditions, and it may be unclear whose state of mind
must be examined. 3 The solution to this problem is for
prisoners to file suit against those policymakers who are ultimately
251. See Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Redman v. County
of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,1443 (9th Cir. 1991)) (holding that an official is deliberately indifferent
when he knows or should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate); Berry v. City
of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990) (requiring: (1) Actual knowledge of the risk or
that the risk was so substantial or pervasive that knowledge could be inferred; (2) a failure to take
reasonable measures to prevent the harm; and (3) a failure which in light of the knowledge justifies
liability for the consequences of the conduct); Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1988)
(stating that an Eighth Amendment violation will be found where defendants know of the danger or
where their knowledge can be inferred due to the substantial or pervasive threat of violence, and yet
defendants fail to enforce a policy or take other reasonable steps which may have prevented the
harm); Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988) (requiring at a
minimum acts or omissions so dangerous that prison officials' knowledge of the risk can be inferred);
Vosburg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir.) (upholding a jury instruction stating that prison
officials are deliberately indifferent if they intend to deprive a right or if they act with reckless
disregard of the right where reckless disregard may be shown by the existence of a pervasive risk of
harm to inmates from other prisoners and a failure by prison officials to reasonably respond to that
risk), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988); Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (upholding a jury instruction stating that deliberate indifference exists when there is an
obvious unreasonable risk of violent harm to a prisoner that is known to be present or should have
been known, and the District, through its employees, was outrageously insensitive or flagrantly
indifferent to the situation and took no significant action to correct or avoid the risk of harm to the
prisoners who were subject to the unreasonable risk of violent harm); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780
F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that conduct is sufficiently reckless to be called punishment
if it implies actual knowledge of impending harm easily preventable, such that a conscious, culpable
refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's failure to prevent it), cern denied,
479 U.S. 816 (1986).
252. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,98-101 (1976) (alleging that medical personnel
inadequately treated the prisoner).
253. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321,2330 (White, J., concurring); see The Supreme Court,
1990 Term - Leading Cases, supra note 210, at 243 (arguing that the cumulative actions of state
actors are responsible for state-sanctioned punislment, and that the Wilson Court's state of mind
requirement for individual prison officials is misconceived).
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accountable for remedying the conditions.254 Regardless of who
created the condlitions, governmental policymakers are responsible
for the prisoners' well-being and could be shown to be deliberately
indifferent to implementing a possible remedy. 5
Courts have also not found deliberate indifference an
impossible standard to apply, as Justice White envisioned, when
prison conditions deteriorate over a long period of time.256 Courts
have stated that deliberate indifference may exist when a long-
standing policy or custom of inaction causes the harm,257 or by
systemic and flagrant deficiencies in staffing, facilities, equipment,
or procedures."58 Moreover, conditions that endure over a long
254. See Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1064-65 (3d Cir. 1991) (permitting
plaintiff to sue a city by showing that the responsible policymakers were deliberately indifferent),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1671 (1992); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 559 (10th Cir. 1980) (prison
inmates filed suit against the state governor, the director or the department of corrections, and the
prison warden, among others); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 854 (D. D.C. 1989)
(prisoners filed suit against the mayor, among others, regarding prison conditions).
255. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (asserting the existence of the
government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it incarcerates and noting the
common law view that it is the public's obligation to care for prisoners since they cannot care for
themselves); Barbara Kritchevsky, Making Sense of State of Mind: Determining Responsibility in
Section 1983 Municipal Liability Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 469-70 (1992) (arguing
that municipalities should be liable when their policymakers' deliberate indifference creates
constitutional violations); James Rosenzweig, Comment, State Prison Conditions and the Eighth
Amendment: What Standard for Refbrm Under Section 1983?, 1987 U. CHi. LEoAL F. 411, 426
(arguing that a warden's failure to remedy oppressive conditions is a violation of his constitutional
obligations).
256. See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text (citing cases applying the deliberate
indifference standard). But see Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330 (White, I., concurring) (speculating that
the deliberate indifference will be impossible to apply in many cases).
257. Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990); see Simmons v. City
of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1064 & n.20 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a showing of deliberate
indifference regarding a failure to train personnel requires evidence that policymakers either chose
not to provide officers with training or acquiesced in a long-standing practice or custom not to
provide training), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 1671 (1992); Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533,1538 (1 th
Cir.) (holding that an unexplained delay in treating a prisoner's serious injury constitutes deliberate
indifference), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 928 (1990); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389,394 (4th Cir. 1987)
(finding that inordinate delays in accommodating basic needs despite the availability and practicality
of solutions due to neglect constituted deliberate indifference).
258. See Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269,272-74 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that insufficient
staffing, including insufficient physicians who could communicate effectively in English, delays in
treatment, and problems stocking supplies constituted deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 468 U.S.
1217 (1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559,575-78 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that staff shortages
effectively denied access to diagnosis and treatment by qualified health care professionals, thus
rendering unnecessary suffering inevitable and constituting deliberate indifference to inmates' serious
313
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
period of time may make it easier to establish the knowledge of
preventable harm that the deliberate indifference standard
requires.
259
Justice White also feared that prison officials would be able to
avoid violating the Eighth Amendment simply by showing that
prison conditions are caused by insufficient funding from state
legislatures, and not by officials' deliberate indifference.26
However, lower courts before and after Wilson have rejected the
argument that inadequate funding precludes a finding that prison
officials are deliberately indifferent, holding that lack of funds is
no excuse for depriving inmates of their constitutional rights.261
medical needs), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Gilland v. Owens, 718 F. Supp. 665,684 (W.D.
Tenn. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed to show deliberate indifference since they did not establish
that deprivations of medical attention occurred with sufficient frequency and that the interference with
medical services was sufficient to create a constitutional violation); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry,
717 F. Supp. 854, 867 (D. D.C. 1989) (holding that systemic failures throughout the medical services
showed deliberate indifference).
259. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (1991). Elizabeth Alexander, counsel for Mr.
Wilson, expressed confidence in being able to prove deliberate indifference in many cases by
showing that inadequate conditions "had been around so long that somebody's got to know about
it." Linda Greenhouse, Justices Restrict Suits Challenging Prison Conditions, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18,
1991, § A, at 1.
260. Wilson, 111 S. CL at 2330-31 (White, J, concurring).
261. See Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[Financial constraints do not allow states to deprive persons of their constitutional rights.");
Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1322 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia,
824 F.2d 1049, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (holding that the Constitution offers no allowances for fiscal
difficulties), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 97 (1991); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir.
1991) (stating that a lack of funds allocated to prisons by the state legislature will not excuse the
failure of prison systems to maintain minimum levels of medical services); Jones v. Johnson, 781
F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that failure to provide necessary treatment due to budgetary
constraints was not justified); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir.
1985) (holding that a county's duty to provide adequate medical treatment to inmates was non-
delegable and notjustified on lack of funds); Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269,274 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that a minimum level of medical service must be maintained despite funding levels), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559,573 & n.19 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating
that lack of funding is no excuse for depriving inmates of their constitutional rights), cert denied,
450 U.S. 1041 (1981). But see Amy Newman, Note, Eighth Amendment - Cruel and Unusual
Punishment and Conditions Cases, 82 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 979, 997-99 (1992) (arguing that an Eighth
Amendment standard with any level of subjective intent will permit a lack of resources defense).
Courts are flexible regarding the alternatives they will permit prison officials to implement to avoid
unconstitutional confinement. See, e.g., Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 937 F.2d 984, 999 (5th
Cir. 1991) (stating that acceptable alternatives to cruel jail conditions included housing prisoners in
a military bootcamp or tent city), cerL denied, Richards v. Lindsay, 112 S. Ct. 1994 (1992).
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The Wilson decision will probably not make it more difficult
for prisoners to obtain relief from harsh prison conditions.
Deliberate indifference requires only that the prison officials have
knowledge of the harmful conditions, and that they fail to take
reasonable steps to rectify those conditions.262 In many Cases,
prison conditions will be so widespread and prominent that officials
could not fail to notice them. In other cases, inmates could easily
make prison officials aware of the conditions with a simple letter
or verbal complaint. Since insufficient funding is generally not a
valid excuse for unconstitutional conditions, officials are required
to take some remedial action if an inmate is deprived of a human
need. If the conditions are not corrected, courts might be faced
with the dangerous prospect of having to let prisoners go free
rather than subject them to cruel and unusual punishment.
Whatever the form of judicial relief, prisoners should not find the
deliberate indifference standard a barrier, provided the deprivations
they suffer are sufficiently serious.
CONCLUSION
The primary significance of Wilson v. Seiter is that it more
precisely defines what "punishment" means under the Eighth
Amendment where prison conditions are at issue. Any pain or
suffering an inmate experiences in prison is not punishment if it
was not inflicted with deliberate indifference. For much of this
century, lower courts held that punishment was imposed only when
a criminal was sentenced. Since Rhodes v. Chapman in 1981, the
Supreme Court has recognized that conditions of confinement could
constitute punishment, and now Wilson v. Seiter has provided a
specific standard by which prisoners may obtain relief.263
Prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement in most
315
262. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (defining the deliberate indifference standard).
263. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327 (requiring the deliberate indifference standard for cases
alleging cruel and unusual conditions of confinement).
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jurisdictions will not find the deliberate indifference standard a
high hurdle to clear.
Richard D. Nobleman
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